



**2nd Battalion Scots Guards
The Battle for Mount
Tumbledown
13th/14th June 1982**

Prepared by Lt Col K Gorman, BA (Hons)

BENT
File name



Falkland Islands Battlefield Tour
2nd Battalion Scots Guards
The Battle for Mount Tumbledown 13th/14th June 1982

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Key Dates

1 Apr - 3 May	Blue Tris in Wales
12 May	QE II from Southampton
27 May	Crossed deck to Canberra
02 June	Landed at San Carlos
05 June	On to HMS Intrepid
06 June	Landed at Bluff Cove
08 June	Shybank attack – Fitzroy W6 Sir
13 June	Move to Ass Area
14 June	Tumbledown + Surrender
15 June	Return to Fitzroy

May 28: Battle of Darwin/Goose Green. 2 Para attack along isthmus from Burntside House and after bitter fighting were investing Goose Green before dawn May 19. 2 Para lose 17 dead including their CO. J Coy 42 Cdo held at Camilla Creek House to reinforce 2 Para.

May 29: Argentine forces at Goose Green surrender. Over 1,000 prisoners taken. 3 Para reach Estancia House and move to Mount Estancia and Mount Vernet.

May 30: K Coy 42 Cdo seize Mount Kent. Recce group of 5 Infantry Brigade arrive San Carlos.

June 1: 2 Para come under the command of 5 Brigade. 42 Cdo move another company on to Mount Kent.

June 2: Canberra and Norland carrying bulk of 5 Brigade arrive San Carlos Water. Brigade lands on Blue Beach. 1/7 Gurkha Rifles move to Sussex Mountains. 2 Scots Guards move to Verde Mountains and 1 Welsh Guards move to Bonners Bay. 2 Para move forward by helicopter to Fitzroy Settlement and Bluff Cove. A Coy of 1/7 Gurkha Rifles move forward to Goose Green to cover area as 2 Para leave.

June 3: 2 Para complete in Bluff Cove/Fitzroy positions. 29 Battery Royal Artillery in support of 2 Para at Bluff Cove. 3 and 4 Troops of B Squadron Blues & Royals also at Bluff Cove. 42 Cdo completes move to Mount Kent. 79 Royal Artillery join 3 Para at Estancia.

June 4: 1/7 Gurkha Rifles complete move to Goose Green to replace 2 Para and help with evacuation of prisoners.

June 5: 42 Cdo start move onto Mount Challenger. 2 Scots Guards embark at San Carlos for sea journey to Bluff Cove.

June 6: 45 Cdo move onto Mount Kent to relieve 42 Cdo who move to Mount Challenger. 2 Scots Guards arrive Bluff Cove. 1 Welsh Guards embark at San Carlos for move by sea to Bluff Cove. Argentine dead from Darwin/Goose Green buried at Darwin.

June 7: 1 Welsh Guards Bn HQ, 1 Rifle Coy and some Sp Coy at Bluff Cove. The remainder of the battalion returning to San Carlos. Sir Tristram anchored in Port Pleasant and unloaded.

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CHRONOLOGY

The account in this book has, inevitably, simplified the military complexities - the sheer human effort - of the conflict. So here, extracted from the Ministry of Defence's own matter-of-fact record of events, is the official diary of the campaign on the Falklands.

- April 2: Argentine invasion of the Falklands.
- April 3: South Georgia taken.
- April 5: First Task Force ships, among them Hermes, Invincible and Fearless, sail from Portsmouth. Lord Carrington resigns as Foreign Secretary.
- April 7: Britain declares 200 miles 'exclusion zone' around the Falklands.
- April 8: US Secretary of State Alexander Haig arrives in London to begin 'shuttle'.
- April 9: Canberra sails from Southampton.
- April 25: South Georgia retaken.
- April 30: US sides with Britain.
- May 1: Vulcans and Harriers bomb Stanley airfield.
- May 2: Argentine cruiser General Belgrano torpedoed.
- May 4: Sheffield hit by Exocet.
- May 15: Raid on Pebble Island to knock out enemy airfield and aircraft.
- May 21: 3 Cdo Brigade lands on East Falkland. 2 Para and 40 Cdo on Blue Beach. 45 Cdo on Red Beach. 3 Para and 42 Cdo on Green Beach. (Blue Beach is San Carlos Settlement, Red is Ajax Bay and Green Beach is Port San Carlos Settlement.)
- May 21/26: Consolidation of bridgehead, patrols move forward. Argentine air attacks hit 11 ships.
- May 27: 45 Cdo move from Red Beach to Green Beach to start overland move to Douglas Settlement. 3 Para leave Green Beach for Teal Inlet and Estancia. 2 Para move toward Darwin and Goose Green, reach Camilla Creek House by last light.

June 8: 1 Welsh Guards' remaining Coy arrive in Port Pleasant on Sir Galahad together with Rapier battery and 16 Field Ambulances. Argentine air attack on Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram and 2 Scots Guards positions at Bluff Cove. 53 dead, 46 injured. Landing craft sunk in Choiseul Sound by Argentine air attack.

June 9: 1/7 Gurkha Rifles, less one company, complete in Bluff Cove, making 5 Brigade complete in that area. Two companies of 40 Cdo put under command of 1 Welsh Guards.

June 10: 2 Para and 1 Welsh Guards under command of 3 Brigade for their attack on Mount Longdon. Two Sisters and Mount Harriet.

June 11/12: 3 Cdo Bde attack on 3 axes. 3 Para attack Mount Longdon with 2 Para in reserve. 45 Cdo attack from Mount Kent onto Two Sisters. 1 Welsh Guards secure start line for 42 Cdo who attack from Mount Challenger onto Mount Harriet and Goat Ridge. All positions taken by first light after heavy hand to hand fighting.

June 12: 1 Welsh Guards return under command 5 Brigade.

June 13/14: 5 Brigade Tac HQ established on Goat Ridge. 2 Scots Guards make diversionary attack with troops of Blues & Royals from Mount Harriet towards Mount William. Under cover of this, 2 Scots Guards attack and take Tumbledown Mountain. 1/7 Gurkha Rifles move through 2 Scots Guards position to assault Mount William. Defenders break and run at dawn, having put up stiff resistance through the night. 1 Welsh Guards make attack to Sapper Hill. White flag flown over Stanley.

June 15: Formal surrender by General Menendez to Major General Jeremy Moore of all Argentine forces on East and West Falklands. 40 Cdo move to West Falkland to effect surrender their.

At about 4.30 am on Friday 2nd April 1982, 140 Argentine Special Forces landed at Mullet Creek. After attacking the Royal Marine Barracks at Moody Brook, they proceeded to surround Government House. Whilst this was happening the main Argentine landing came ashore at the Airport. Despite a fighting retreat by the 61 men of Naval Party 8901, as the Islands Marine detachment were called, the Governor surrendered at 0925 hrs.

The Argentinian Army now set about consolidating their victory using Stanley Airport, which they managed to keep open until hours before their final surrender. They brought in some 1100 men, APCs, armoured cars and artillery. In preparation for an attack they hoped would not come, they dug in and mined areas.

Back in the UK a Task Force was rapidly put together and on the 5th April the carriers Invincible and Hermes, accompanied by the assault ship Fearless set out for the Falklands. Four days later the liner Canberra carrying some members of the Parachute Regiment and Marines sailed. In all over 100 ships came to play their part in returning the Falklands to Britain.

On the 21st May the initial landings in San Carlos Water commenced at:

- a. Green Beach at Port San Carlos - 3 Para and 42 Commando.
- b. Blue Beach at San Carlos Settlement - 40 Commando.
- c. Blue Beach 2 at San Carlos Settlement - 2 Para and subsequently 5 Inf Bde.
- d. Red Beach at Ajax Bay - 45 Commando.

The battle for the Falklands was now on.

Meanwhile in London, the Second Battalion Scots Guards (2 SG) was finding the Queen's Guard at Buckingham Palace, St James's Palace and the Tower of London. Little did members of the Battalion then imagine that within ten weeks they would have landed on the Falkland Islands. Far less could they have guessed that they would be involved in a full scale battle which would directly influence the timing of the Argentinian capitulation, thus curtailing hostilities and saving further loss of life.

Exactly a week later, on Good Friday, the Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel M I E Scott, accompanied by Major I C Mackay-Dick MBE, Second in Command and Captain T S Spicer, Operations Officer, attended a briefing at Headquarters 5 Infantry Brigade in Aldershot. The Brigade Commander, Brigadier M J A Wilson OBE MC, explained that the Battalion, together with 1st Battalion Welsh Guards (1 WG) might come under command of 5 Infantry Brigade for possible deployment to the Falkland Islands. This was merely the first of many such briefings and conferences which ultimately led to a brigade exercise in Wales between 21st April and 3rd May and to the Brigade's departure on RMS Queen Elizabeth II (QE II) from Southampton at 1600 hours on Wednesday 12th May.

The Battalion's stay on QE II was extremely comfortable. There was no lowering of the high standards of accommodation and service traditionally associated with such liners. There was ample space for intensive training, consisting of continuation training on all weapons, intelligence briefings, signals, first aid and PT. Shortly after the QE II sailed south of Ascension Island, on 22nd May, active service conditions were introduced. A ship's blackout was imposed as a security measure. On the 27th May QE II arrived at Grytviken, South Georgia where the Battalion cross-loaded into SS Canberra. It will be

recalled that a Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) of 200 miles radius of the Falklands had been established as soon as the original Task Force, which had sailed on 8th April, was in a position to enforce it. 2 SG entered the TEZ in Canberra and, at 1435 hours on 2nd June, landed at San Carlos in landing craft (LCU).

The Battalion's arrival came three days after the remarkable success of 2nd Battalion The Parachute Regiment (2 PARA) at Darwin/Goose Green at which 1200 prisoners were taken and many enemies killed. 3 Commando Brigade was advancing on foot in the Northern part of East Falkland and 5 Infantry Brigade (now including 2 PARA) was to move against Stanley in the South,

San Carlos to Bluff Cove

The Battalion dug in at San Carlos and occupied its position for three days. Throughout the operations, first light was at about 0700 hours local time and last light at 1600 hours. Digging in is perhaps not the correct terminology. Any trench more than two feet deep filled with water, so trenches were dug as deep as possible and then sangars were constructed out of peat and rocks. The Battalion command post was initially a large hole with a tarpaulin stretched over it. This was extremely difficult to operate in and it was soon replaced by a dug in 9 x 9 tent.

During the three day stay at San Carlos, the Battalion was warned to be prepared to move forward to the area of Bluff Cove to relieve 2 PARA. 2 PARA had reached Bluff Cove following the now well documented telephone call from the Swan Inlet House to Fitzroy/Bluff Cove. Acting on information from the local population, the Brigade Commander ordered 2 PARA to send a party in Scout helicopters forward to Swan Inlet House to ascertain by telephone whether the enemy were in Fitzroy or Bluff Cove. In the event, the 14 year old daughter of the Fitzroy settlement manager confirmed by telephone that the enemy was at neither location. The Brigade Commander commandeered a Chinook helicopter originally tasked to extract 2 PARA's prisoners and ordered 2 PARA to deploy a force forward to secure the two settlements for further operations.

The Operations Officer flew forward to Bluff Cove with the Commanding Officer of the Welsh Guards, Lieutenant Colonel J F Rickett MBE, to recon and liaise on Friday 4th June. On the afternoon of the 5th June, the Commanding Officer moved to Darwin for an O Group. The Battalion, under the Second in Command, embarked on the assault ship HMS Intrepid for the move to Bluff Cove. Due to the threat of a land based Exocet missile system, Intrepid would only take the Battalion to the area of Lively Island where it was off-loaded into Intrepid's LCUs and continue the journey to Bluff Cove. This was considered to be quite adventurous as the LCU is not really designed for offshore work and as well as being uncomfortable, is virtually unprotected and therefore vulnerable. The journey itself was extremely unpleasant. For seven hours all ranks were jammed into four open LCUs. It was bitterly cold and showers of drenching ice cold sea water continually came over the side. At one stage nerves stretched when star shells from a 105mm gun burst overhead. There was concern that the LCUs had been spotted from the shore and that at any moment the illumination rounds would be followed by high explosive. This feeling was intensified when the Battery Commander, Major R T Gwyn, took cover as the third star shell burst overhead. (in fact these shells came from a suspicious Naval ship, HMS Arrow).

changed over. The former remained two miles forward of the main Brigade line for seven cold and snowy days, providing an excellent Observation Post for Mounts Harriet, Tumbledown, William and Sapper Hill. That there were few exposure casualties in the atrocious conditions testifies to the extremely high standard of junior leadership within the Battalion. One of the exposure cases recovered after resuscitation by his platoon commander, Lieutenant R A D Lawrence. At the time the Commanding Officer's priority was the physical survival of the Battalion rather than operations against the Argentinians.

Whilst at Bluff Cove, the Battalion received most valuable and welcome help from the settlement's civilians. Mr Kevin Kilmartin and others, including Mr Tim Dobbyn and Mr Mike Mackay plus two Polish seamen who had jumped ship and sought asylum shortly before the hostilities began, placed their two tractors at the Battalion's disposal and drove back and forth throughout the day bringing bergen rucksacks, rations and ammunition the one and a half miles from the beach. The Regimental Aid Post was set up in the Kilmartin's house and tea and wads were made available to all.

Port Harriet House - Operation Impunity

The first offensive operation mounted by the Battalion was the establishment of an advanced patrol base 12 kilometres forward of Bluff Cove from which the Recce Platoon could operate. This was well within the enemy's area of operations. The platoon task was to locate and destroy two 105mm gun positions and a radar site which Brigade Headquarters had suggested were on Port Harriet and Sea Point.

The Recce Platoon Commander, Captain R A Scott, was briefed by the Operations Officer on the 7th June. The platoon, less Sergeant Coull's section, together with a Forward Observation Officer (FOO) Captain K Miller and Engineer Recce Party (from 9 PARA Sqn RE) set out soon after last light. The Battalion waited with anticipation for news of the first strike at the enemy.

The first report to come through indicated that Port Harriet House appeared to be occupied. However, further inspection revealed that this was not so and the house was then occupied by Sergeant Allum's patrol. Captain Scott took his other patrols to search for the 105mm gun positions. Unfortunately the information acted upon proved to be inaccurate and no gun positions were found. The patrols returned to Port Harriet House.

The following day the Battalion was joined by a four man patrol from G Squadron 22 SAS who were going to operate within 2 SG's area of responsibility. Although not under the Battalion's command, they had some spare time so it was decided that their first task would be to help Sergeant Allum's patrol of the Recce Platoon to destroy the enemy radar site.

Major The Honourable R N Bethell MBE and Captain T S Spicer tried to insert the SAS patrol to Port Harriet House and resupply the Recce Platoon using two civilian landrovers driven by Messrs Dobbyn and Mackay. This group was only 700 m from Port Harriet House when the leading vehicle ran over an anti-personnel mine which damaged a front wheel. The members of the group dismounted only to discover that they were in the middle of a minefield. Extraction from the minefield was a slow business involving moving carefully along the tyre tracks of the landrover and then reversing the vehicles out. The wheel on the landrover was changed and the group returned to Bluff Cove.

Sergeant Allum's patrol was unable to locate the radar site and it was later discovered that no such site existed. The patrol then returned to Port Harriet House.

The following day (9th June) this operation came to a dramatic end. The Commanding Officer received outline instructions for a possible advance on the Southern flank towards Stanley. Preparations for this advance required the Recce Platoon to carry out certain reconnaissance tasks and also to be aware of future Brigade plans, including the patrol programme of 42 Commando Royal Marines who were immediately to the North. The Commanding Officer decided that the maintenance of the covert patrol base had become less important than our arrangements for the possible advance. He then sent a helicopter to extract the Recce Platoon commander for briefing. The enemy's reaction was quicker and in greater strength than had been expected. In the late afternoon the Recce Platoon came under mortar and small arms fire. It also appeared that ground forces were moving in to the attack. Accordingly Sergeant Allum gave the order to withdraw and the platoon moved out under intense mortar fire. During this time Sergeant Allum and two others were wounded. The Commanding Officer sent Captain Scott in a Scout helicopter from Battalion Headquarters to the platoon's emergency RV. Staff Sergeant Bell (APTC) guided the helicopter in with his torch and the casualties were evacuated direct to the field hospital at Ajax Bay. Captain Scott then led the remainder of his platoon back through a minefield to a pre-arranged RV where they were picked up by a Troop of the Blues and Royals in their Scorpions and returned to Bluff Cove at about midnight. During the evacuation of the Recce Platoon, artillery engaged enemy positions on Mount Harriet. In this account of the operations, the Commander of 5 Infantry Brigade stated that the information from this "... 2 SG patrol was the best intelligence received by the Brigade throughout the campaign". He valued particularly the indication that the enemy were deployed to meet a threat launched from the South and along the track running from Bluff Cove to Stanley.

Bluff Cove

On the 8th June, while the Port Harriet minefield incident was taking place, the Battalion was placed on air raid warning RED at 1259 hours. Very shortly afterwards, five Argentinian A4 Skyhawks came over. It was later discovered that they attacked the LSLs off Fitzroy causing tragic losses for the Welsh Guards. At 1530 hours four more Skyhawks came over and were engaged by small arms fire from most of the Battalion, who fired 18,600 rounds. One was definitely hit, possibly by Lance Corporal Winfield of the Machine Gun Platoon using his 0.5 inch Browning. Four more aircraft came in and a second one was brought down. A third was possibly hit. The last wave jettisoned two bombs and a drop tank which fell short of Right Flank's position. The Battalion had suffered no casualties, and as an introduction to battle this engagement proved a tremendous morale booster.

On the afternoon of 10th June, an enemy 155mm battery began adjusting fire onto G Company's position. Sporadic shelling continued for the next two days. One G Company sangar was demolished but there were no injuries.

[illegible]

Two Sisters

Goat Ridge

2 SG
ASSY
AREA

FUP

Mt Harriet MG PL

6 MOR

2SG
(TAC)



Tumbledown Mt

Mt William

Mt Longdon

3
PARA

START
LINE

	3/4	1/2	1/4	0
Mile 1				
Mile 1				

THE PLAN FOR THE FINAL BATTLE FOR STANLEY

On the 9th June the 5 Brigade Orders Group assembled at Fitzroy to consider the plan for the attack on Stanley.

3 Commando Brigade was to attack Two Sisters and Mount Harriet by night with 45 Commando taking the former objective and 42 Commando the latter. The 3rd Battalion the Parachute Regiment was to put in a feint attack on Mount Longdon. Simultaneously the 1st/7th Duke of Edinburgh's Own Gurkha Rifles (1/7 GR) would patrol against Mount Tumbledown and Mount William. 2 SG, with a company of Gurkhas, was to move along the Southern flank to conform with 3 Commando Brigade. It was planned that if Tumbledown and William were not to fall to the 1/7 Gurkhas patrols, 2 SG would attack the features at first light on the 12th or 13th June from the South.

On his return to the Battalion for the Orders Group the Commanding Officer held a planning meeting with the Second in Command, the Company Commanders, the Battery Commander, the Adjutant and the Operations and Intelligence Officers. He was concerned that the Brigade plan involved a rather predictable long uphill daylight assault across difficult ground during which the Battalion would be extremely vulnerable. (It was subsequently learned that ten sustained fire machine guns dominated this approach). He preferred the alternative of a flanking attack launched by night from the already secured Commando positions to the West of Tumbledown.

The Brigade Commander approved of the flanking attack alternative and gave formal orders at Fitzroy on the 10th June. The Battalion was to attack Tumbledown. 1/7 GR were to attack Mt William and 1 WG to be prepared to move forward and capture Sapper Hill.

THE BATTLE FOR MOUNT TUMBLEDOWN

On Colonel Scott's return to Bluff Cove the final details of the operation were worked out. The Commanding Officer gave his orders at 1530 hours. The plan was for a silent night attack of 3 phases preceded by a small diversionary attack from the obvious Southerly direction. The fire plan was to include **fighter** ground attack, five batteries of 105mm light guns, and naval gun fire from HMS Active and Yarmouth. The mortars of 42 Commando RM and 1/7 GR were also to be available. Each phase would involve a company attack on a different part of the objective. Phase 1 was for G Company to take the first part of Tumbledown immediately after the diversionary attack. Phase II involved Left Flank moving through and assaulting the main part of the mountain (GR332723 to GR 340723). In Phase III Right Flank would secure the final part.

The Battalion's move to its assembly area was planned for 0800 hours on the 12th June but was **postponed** as helicopters were not available until too late. At 1100 hours the Commanding Officer was called to Brigade Headquarters and given further information about the enemy and about 3 Commando Brigade's attack the previous evening. It was agreed that in view of the delay over helicopter availability the attack should be postponed until the following night. A helicopter was provided for the Battalion reconnaissance (R Group) to move forward to observe Tumbledown from the area of Goat Ridge. At last light on the 12th June the R Group returned to Bluff Cove.

On the morning of the 13th the Battalion moved by support helicopter to the assembly area. On arrival, sangers were constructed. The R Group and platoon and commanders went forward to observe the enemy positions. If nothing else the campaign proved conclusively (again) the value of the old military maxim that time spent in reconnaissance is never wasted. The assembly area was shelled sporadically from about 1000 hours onwards. Lance Sergeant McGeorge was wounded. Another shell scored a spectacular direct hit on the equipment of Lance Corporal Campbell and Guardsman Greenshield - which they had discarded while they dug in - setting off their white phosphorous grenades.

At 1400 hours the Commanding Officer delivered confirmatory orders. The journalists, A J McIlroy (Daily Telegraph) and Tony Snow (Sun), who were to accompany Battalion Headquarters, attended. It was decided that the Forming Up Point (FUP) guides and controllers - the Recce Platoon under command of the Second in Command - were to be in position by 1900 hours having held daylight rehearsals. G Company, leading the attack, were to cross the start line at 2100 hours.

For the attack on Mount Tumbledown bergen rucksacks were not carried. The Battalion were 'belt kit' only but with six sleeping bags carried per Company to help in the treatment of casualties.

The verbal recognition signals to be used within the Battalion and also 1/7 GR were considered. The NATO password system was discarded in favour of the more practical and less formal "Hey Jimmy" for the Battalion and "Hey Johnny" for identifying the Gurkhas. While this may sound a trivial point, the system adopted proved of considerable importance during the battle.

THE DIVERSIONARY ATTACK

The attack was intended to distract the enemy's attention from the Battalion's move from Goat Ridge to the foot of Mount Tumbledown. It was hoped that the diversion would convince the enemy that our attack would be from the Southern flank.

The attacking force, under command of Officer Commanding Headquarter Company, consisted of three four man assault sections from the Recce Platoon and a fire support group consisting of personnel from the Battle Group Headquarters and A1 Echelon. Specialist support was provided by a troop of the Blues and Royals (RHG/D), two Sappers who acted as scouts, a Bombardier FOO and a Mortar Fire Controller.

By the time the diversion was due to start the force was in position, but no enemy had been located in spite of their having been seen during the earlier visual recce. Major Bethell sent the RHG/D troop forward towards the Stanley road to try to attract enemy fire. The leading Scorpion soon went over an anti personnel mine without any of the enemy reacting, so the main patrol advanced towards the enemy on foot.

At about 2045 hours a possible enemy sangar was spotted through a night sight at 75 metres. The fire support group under Company Sergeant Major Braby moved to the South to find a fire position while the assault groups commanded by Major Bethell, Drill Sergeant Wight and Sergeant Coull closed on the enemy, who continued to display no reaction.

The assault groups were almost upon the first sangar when snoring was heard and other sangars were seen. As the groups split up to deal with the various sangars they came under heavy fire and a fierce exchange of fire ensued. Drill Sergeant Wight and Lance Corporal Pashley (Royal Engineers) were killed at once in the assault on the northernmost trench. Four other patrol members were wounded but three pipers administered first aid, which saved further loss of life. x20
4x4

The enemy continued to bring down heavy fire from a number of sangars and trenches, including a machine gun post. At first the fire of the fire support group was neutralised and the patrol was disorganised by the casualties taken and consequent medical requirements. Nonetheless, the position was eventually secured after almost two hours of continuous fire, interspersed with systematic assaults on individual trenches and sangars.

Extraction of the patrol with the dead and wounded proved difficult, as it had to be accomplished on foot. One enemy emerged from a sangar unexpectedly and before he was killed, threw a hand grenade which caused shrapnel wounds to Major Bethell and Piper Duffy, who were covering the withdrawal. x20

Further casualties occurred when Lance Sergeants Miller and McIntock, Lance Corporal Mitchell and Guardsman Carruthers - all of whom were carrying the badly wounded - trod on two anti personnel mines. The enemy called down defensive fire on the area but its effect was happily slight in the peaty ground. At this stage the dead had to be abandoned. The patrol moved slowly back, clearing the way by using their torches which helped them to avoid at least one further mine. At about 0030 hours the RV was reached. Tumbledown, the scene of the main attack, was lit up by artillery fire and .50 tracer fired from Mount Harriet. x20
144m

PHASE 1

G Company planned to advance in two columns for the three kilometres from the Forming Up Point (FUP) across the open saddle, and to take the first crags of the Tumbledown feature in two phases. 7 Platoon, commanded by Lieutenant M W Joynson, and Company Headquarters were to secure the first company objective supported by 8 Platoon, commanded by Second Lieutenant C S T Page. Then 9 Platoon commanded by Lieutenant C J Blount and 8 Platoon were to move forward supported by Company Headquarters to secure the second company objective estimated to be a machine gun post. The CQMS's party, with stretchers, pipes and reserve medical kit was to bring up the rear. G Company moved off silently from the FUP and crossed the wire fence marking the start line at 2100 hours. By this time the diversionary attack was under way and there was considerable noise from the Southern slopes of Tumbledown and Harriet. As the company advanced through snow flurries and sporadic shell and mortar fire, star shells were frequently fired from the outskirts of Stanley and from a battery somewhere near the South of Moody Brook. These lit the whole battlefield and, until the slope leading to the first company objective was reached, progress was slow. At this point there had been no enemy reaction and as the first column was by then in ground hidden from the Argentinian position, 7 Platoon and Company Headquarters covered each other through this objective. The enemy had deserted it. 8 and 9 Platoons began to move against the machine gun post while Company Headquarters moved into the Tumbledown Crags to be able to cover both North and South of the mountain. The Company remained undetected. The assault platoons also found this second objective deserted although a Spanish voice was heard in the rocks above. The second phase of the attack began with Left Flank advancing through G Company at 2230 hours and coming under fire. Almost immediately, G Company gave supporting fire with automatic weapons until the fire could no longer be safely effective for Left Flank. This supporting fire drew mortar and shell fire onto the rocks around G Company from the enemy mortar line behind Mount William and the gun battery in Stanley. More of 9 Platoon were hit at this stage, including Sergeant McDonald who refused treatment until the next morning. A Company Medical Aid Post was set up by 9 Platoon Commander, who on two occasions protected with his own body, wounded who could not move. When Left Flank began to take severe casualties, G Company provided the CQMS with his echelon group, as extra medical orderlies and 8 Platoon, who were uncommitted, as stretcher teams to join the Left Flank CQMS, for the three kilometre carry back to the Regimental Aid Post (RAP). These went forward through the machine gun fire that was holding up Left Flank to recover the wounded and pass them through the Company Medical Aid Post. Apart from replying to the regular sniper fire coming from the crags above Company Headquarters, G Company took no further part in the action. The company wounded, including a Gurkha, dropped off by his company, were evacuated the next day.

PHASE 2

Left Flank passed through G Company at 2230 hours and started climbing the main feature of Tumbledown Mountain with 13 Platoon, under command of Second Lieutenant J D Stuart, moving up to the crags on the left, 15 Platoon, under command of Lieutenant A M Mitchell, advancing on the lower ground to the right and 14 Platoon, commanded by Lieutenant A H J Fraser in reserve behind Company Headquarters. Almost immediately, two or three enemy semi-automatic weapons opened up on 15 Platoon who went to ground and returned the fire. The immediate section attack by Lance Sergeant Dalgleish's section was beaten off by superior enemy automatic fire in depth, and there started an accurate and increasingly heavy bombardment by enemy artillery and mortars which continued throughout the night. Enemy movement about 100 - 200 metres ahead could be seen through weapon night sights (IWS) and in moving into fire positions to engage them, two casualties were taken by 15 Platoon. Guardsmen Strilling was shot and killed and Sergeant Jackson received a shrapnel wound in the thigh.

At about the same time, 13 Platoon in the rocks were engaged by enemy snipers equipped with excellent night sights, killing Guardsman Francini, mortally wounding Sergeant Simeon and wounding Lance Corporal Eyre. Company Sergeant Major Nicol was shot in the hand while going to Sergeant Simeon's aid and Guardsman Shaw had a lucky escape when a bullet was stopped by the three magazines in his left breast pocket. Both 13 and 15 Platoons attempted to dislodge their enemy with 84mm, 66mm and M79, but although this was partially effective in the high ground against the sniper positions, it appeared to have little effect on the enemy facing 15 Platoon.

For several hours 13 Platoon's sections tried to fight through the rocks and crags and achieved some success with high explosives and white phosphorous grenades. The leading sections, commanded by Lance Sergeants Davidson and McGuinness flushed out the forward snipers and, following the enemy's communication cable, located and destroyed several sangars and sniper positions, despite fierce enemy resistance. The enemy in front of 15 Platoon continued to put down a heavy weight of fire, some of them shouting and singing as they did so, but several were killed by Lance Sergeant Mitchell and his section with IWS fitted weapons. The FOO and MFC attempted to bring down fire on the enemy immediately to the front of 15 Platoon, but for much of the time only one mortar (out of six) was working and technical problems hampered the FOO's adjustment of fire. Throughout the campaign the soft ground was found to degrade the effect of mortar fire. The mortars soon bedded themselves in and had to be moved and their fire re-adjusted. A number of mortars broke when firing on maximum charge.

14 Platoon was moving up to exploit 13 Platoon's hard-won gains when artillery rounds arrived on target in front of 15 Platoon. After three rounds fire-for-effect from one battery, Lieutenant Mitchell led a platoon attack, supported by Company Headquarters and weapons of 13 Platoon, on the forward enemy positions.

15 Platoon's assault with grenades and rifles proved successful and four or five enemy sangars were taken. As Company Headquarters moved forward to join them, further opportunities to maintain the momentum of the attack became apparent, and with the two sections of 15 Platoon an assault was made on the next group of enemy about 200 metres up the hill. About eight enemy were killed with grenades, rifles and bayonets and an equal number gave themselves up. The Company Commander himself killed two and bayoneted a third. One enemy round passed through his left front pouch and bayonet scabbard before lodging in his compass. Although one section commander, Lance Sergeant Mitchell was shot dead and another man wounded, the assault continued up the hill with further enemy sangars, and bunkers being taken at the point of the bayonet; but with the demands of clearing those positions and guarding the prisoners as they were taken, only seven men arrived at the top of the mountain. Below them were the lights of Port Stanley with some half dozen enemy running down the hill. Of those seven, three, including the Platoon

Commander, Lieutenant Mitchell, were immediately cut down by a burst of machine gun fire. The Company Commander and three men were holding Tumbledown Mountain. Within fifteen minutes, several other members of 15 Platoon and Company Headquarters arrived to help in securing the objective and 14 Platoon were called forward, arriving soon after.

A small enemy counter attack was driven off, mainly by 14 Platoon, but not before Lance Sergeant Wash and Lance Corporal Coventry had been seriously wounded by grenade shrapnel, and Lance Corporal Wilson and Guardsman Reynolds hit by rifle fire.

As these casualties were being evacuated, the stretcher party received a direct hit from a mortar bomb. Guardsman Reynolds (who although wounded, was carrying a stretcher) and Guardsman Malcolmson were killed and eight other men wounded.

The Left Flank action had taken over seven hours. Over 30 bodies were subsequently removed from the battlefield, 20 prisoners were taken and an unknown number put to flight. The cost was 7 men killed and 21 wounded, 18 of whom were admitted to hospital.

Several of the wounded owed their lives to the prompt first aid, often under fire, which they received from their comrades. In particular from Piper Rodgers, the Company Medic, who worked ceaselessly throughout the night and treated all the casualties.

PHASE 3

At about 0600 hours Major S A C Price and his two forward platoons (2 Platoon commanded by Second Lieutenant M W V Mathewson, and 3 Platoon commanded by Lieutenant R A D Lawrence) moved forward. Major Price was briefed by Major Kiszely who indicated the ground and told them that the fire from an enemy machine gun and some snipers 2 or 300 yards ahead had wounded four men, including Lieutenant Mitchell. Three of the wounded were pinned down behind a rock and the determined enemy were unflinching in the face of Left Flank fire from 84mm and 66mm.

Major Price selected the right flanking approach to the enemy as it offered the best cover. He delivered short orders to his FOO, Captain Miller, his Company Second in Command, his Platoon Commanders and his Company Sergeant Major. Unfortunately the gun position officer was unable to agree to register the target because of the believed proximity of 1/7 GR, who in fact did not arrive until later.

THE RIGHT FLANK PLAN

The Right Flank plan was for 2 and 3 Platoons to assault with Company Headquarters in the centre and 1 Platoon (commanded by Second Lieutenant the Viscount Dalrymple) giving covering fire from Left Flank's position. Fire support was to be provided on the Company Commander's orders and 84mm and 66mm were to be fired immediately before the assault. Speed was essential as daylight was only half an hour away. No artillery fire support was available and the mortars remained largely unserviceable.

After leaving the FUP, the assaulting sections moved forward firing their anti tank and other weapons as they went. Ricochets flew in all directions in the rocky terrain. A dozen men, amongst them Captain P A Bryden and Lieutenant Lawrence, gained a foothold on the ledge occupied by the enemy. The reorganisation phase revealed that two enemy had been killed and four captured.

Shortly afterwards the attack was resumed, principally against three groups of enemy who had not been seen before the initial company assault had been launched. Leaving his Headquarters to guard the prisoners, the Company Commander went forward to coordinate the actions of the attacking parties, who moved forward using fire and movement. On the North side of the objective, Captain Bryden and Lieutenant Lawrence, with two parties, moved along the higher levels of the rocks while Second Lieutenant Mathewson moved along the lower slopes. On the South side no progress could be made initially, because of enemy on the narrow centre ridge. Guardsman Pengelly was driven back by heavy enemy fire as he tried to approach the crest. However, Sergeant Jackson took out the top machine gun post after discarding his rifle and climbing the rocks to throw a grenade. This killed one enemy and enabled the advance up the narrow ridge to continue. A little further on Sergeant Jackson and Lance Sergeant Baxter then killed an enemy and captured a further wounded one. This action cleared the way for 2 Platoon under Sergeant Robertson and reinforcements from 1 Platoon to move rapidly forward and eventually link up with Captain Bryden who was by then in the rocks at the Eastern end of the position.

Captain Bryden had reached the rocks only after encountering stiff resistance on the North side of the objective. While his and Lieutenant Lawrence's groups had moved along the high ground, enemy snipers had wounded first Guardsmen Harkness and McEnteggart and then Lieutenant Lawrence (who was shot in the head, rendering

the latter's group ineffective. With Lance Sergeant McDermid and Lance Corporal Richardson giving covering fire, Lance Corporal Rennie bravely brought the wounded officer into cover. Meanwhile Captain Bryden and Guardsman Morton had reached the Eastern end of the objective, before Morton too was hit.

The arrival of reinforcements from 1 and 2 Platoons, who had been called forward by the Company Commander, secured the end crags for Right Flank. After considerable movement in the area, the enemy mounted heavy machine gun fire on the Company's forward elements. However, heavy machine gun fire was returned from Lance Corporal Campbell's section and the enemy withdrew, bringing down artillery fire as they did so. *pl. 6/15/59.*

The engagement ended at about 0800 hours. Seven enemy had been killed and 14 captured (of whom five were wounded). 5 Right Flankers had been wounded.

Once the position had been secured, the Right Flank FOO, Captain Miller, started directing effective fire onto Port Stanley. He was on his third "Fire Mission", when the enemy were seen leaving their trenches and walking around. After reporting to his Regiment what he saw, Captain Miller was directed to cease firing. The time was about 0815 hours.

The immediate priority was to evacuate the wounded. Captain Bryden collected the prisoners and the walking wounded and took them back to the Regimental Police and RAP. It took some time for the Company Commander to organise a defensive position, as platoons were thoroughly mixed up and many key men were looking after casualties.

The Company was told shortly afterwards that the enemy had surrendered and that only action in self defence was to be conducted.

During helicopter evacuation of casualties, the prisoners taken by Left and Right Flank were brought to Battalion Tactical Headquarters. Amongst them was an officer who had commanded one of the positions. While the officer was questioned in Spanish by Captain J R E Campbell-Lamerton, a sniper fired on the Scout helicopter which was taking out the casualties. The Argentinian officer was invited to order this lone sniper to stop firing and surrender forthwith. The sniper did not do so, but caused no further trouble, and it is assumed that he fled, or surrendered to the G.I.s who were moving up towards Mount William. The Commanding Officer moved forward to visit Left and Right Flank and to examine the enemy positions. Accompanied by the Battery Commander, the Operations Officer and his signaller, Lance Corporal Scott, he set off across the Southern slope of the feature. They were impressed with the degree of preparation of the Argentinian positions, the majority of which included well dug in sangars and shelter trenches with effective overhead cover. While the party was moving across this ground, news came on the radio that the Argentinian forces on the Falkland Islands had surrendered. The Battalion spent the night of the 14th/15th June on Tumbledown before moving by helicopter to Fitzroy.


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Sup	Forming up Point
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FORMING up POSEPT
FINAL ASSAULT POSITIONS
Route of Capt Bryden's Co
Route of 2d Mathewson's
Route of Big Price's group
Route of Sgt Robertson's
Machine Gun

Open grassy areas
Stepping mountain side

To meet



ORBAT

2ND BATTALION SCOTS GUARDS

14 JUNE 1982

BATTALION HEADQUARTERS

Commanding Officer	Lieutenant Colonel M I E Scott DSO
Second in Command	Major I C Mackay-Dick MBE
Adjutant	Captain M A Bullough
Operations Officer	Captain T S Spicer
Intelligence Officer	Captain A W Foster
Regimental Signals Officer	Captain W P B Ellis
Anti Tank Platoon Commander	Captain J R E Campbell-Lamerton
Mortar Officer	Captain P J L Farrelly
Assistant Intelligence Officer	Lieutenant A A Bruce
Medical Officer	Lieutenant Colonel A J Warsap RAMC
Medical Officer (16 Fd Amb Det)	Major K N A Millar RAMC
Paymaster	Captain D W O'Keefe RAPC
Battery Commander	Major R T Gwyn RA
Forward Observation Officer	Captain W D Nicol RA
Forward Observation Officer	Lieutenant K H Miller RA

RIGHT FLANK

Company Commander	Major S A C Price
Company Second in Command	Captain I A Bryden
No 1 Platoon Commander	2 Lieutenant The Viscount Dalrymple
No 2 Platoon Commander	2 Lieutenant M W V Mathewson
No 3 Platoon Commander	Lieutenant R A D Lawrence MC

G COMPANY

Company Commander	Major I E Dalziel-Job
Company Second in Command	Captain J H O'H Pollock IG
No 7 Platoon Commander	Lieutenant M W Joynson
No 8 Platoon Commander	2 Lieutenant C S T Page
No 9 Platoon Commander	Lieutenant C J Blount

LEFT FLANK

Company Commander	Major J P Kiszely MC
Company Second in Command	Captain The Hon G C W Grimston
No 13 Platoon Commander	2 Lieutenant J D Stuart
No 14 Platoon Commander	Lieutenant A H J Fraser
No 15 Platoon Commander	Lieutenant A M Mitchell

RECCE PLATOON

Platoon Commander	Captain R A Scott
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ECHELON

Commander	Major The Hon R N Bethell MBE
Quartermaster	Major C Brown
Technical Quartermaster	Captain E Lawrie
Mechanical Transport Officer	Captain R Paterson

DRUMS PLATOON ORBAT

PL HQ

DMaj Davidson
Sgt Hynds
LCpl Wilson

No 1 Section

LSgt MacKay
LCpl Urban
Dmr Coakes
Dmr Griffiths
Dmr Henshaw
Dmr Martin
Dmr Philip
Dmr Wilson

No 2 Section

LSgt Robinson
LCpl Rennie
Dmr Bruton
Dmr Coventry
Dmr Gould
Dmr Greaves
Dmr King
Dmr Spence

No 3 Section

LSgt Clark
LCpl Boyd
LCpl Brown
Dmr Ayling
Gdsm Bell
Dmr Grieve
Dmr Hopewell
Dmr McClure

ECHELON

ECH HQ

Maj The Hon BETHELL
Maj SMITH
CSM Braby
CSM Bunyan
CQMS Callachan
CQMS Gault
CSgt Robinson
Sgt Hicklin
Sgt McCormack
LSgt Paterson
LSgt Walker
LCpl Mitchell
Gdsm McLennan

ORD RM

ORQMS Archibald
LSgt Cerson
LSgt MacRae
LCpl Nicholson

QM

Maj BROWN
PSM Hope
CSgt McInnes
Sgt Boyd
Sgt Naismith
LSgt Fawcett
LSgt Fletcher
LSgt McInnes
LSgt McKie
LSgt Wolff
LCpl Gray
LCpl Toole
Gdsm Dougherty
Gdsm Marsh

TQM

Capt LAWRIE
TSM Taylor
SSgt McDowell
LSgt Edgar
LSgt Leitch
LSgt Slucock
LCpl Parkin
Cfn Byrne
Cfn Hoare

MT PL

Capt PATERSON
CSgt Smith
Sgt MacDonald
Sgt Swaney
LSgt Fyfe
LSgt Ogston
LSgt Southward
LCpl Gavican
LCpl Nicol
Gdsm Brown 13
Gdsm Denwood
Gdsm Reid
Gdsm Ritchie
X Gdsm Rose
Gdsm Rutherford
Gdsm Westwood

SIGS PL

Sgt Rankin
Cpl Watt
LCpl McNeill
Gdsm Hay
Gdsm Noble

MED CENTRE

LSgt McQuarrie
Gdsm Irons

COOKS

SQMS Connor
Sgt Backhurst
LSgt Trodden
LCpl Miles
Pte Bellew
Pte Delves
Pte Green
Pte Houston-Robb
Pte Laycock

PAY

SQMS Foley
Pte O'Leary

LAD

Sgt McCulloch
LCpl Webster

ROYAL SIGNALS

Sig Crook
Sig Weatherly

BG HQ

Lt Col SCOTT
Maj MACKAY, DICK
Capt BULLOUGH
Capt SPICER
Capt O'KELFE
DSgt Wight
PMaj Riddell
Sgt Hatton
LCpl Stephen
Gdsm Burns
Gdsm Boyes
Gdsm Clark
Gdsm Cuthel
Gdsm Newton

Int

Capt FOSTER
Lt BRUCE
Sgt Williams
LSgt Leslie
LSgt Reavley
LSgt Sherrett
Gdsm McIntosh

OP CLEMS

Sgt Stewart
LCpl Kendall
LCpl Lockwood

SIGS PL

Capr ELLIS
CSgt Walker
Sgt Third
LSgt Marshall
LCpl Hush
LCpl Michael
LCpl Scott
Gdsm Clarke
Gdsm Davidson
Gdsm Elliott
Gdsm McGowan

RP STAFF

RSM MacKenzie
CSM Kaye
CSM Sulley
Sgt Pettit
LSgt Johnston
LCpl McCoy
Gdsm Ainslie

RAP

Lt Col WARSAP
CSgt Baird
LSgt Meechan
LCpl Gibson
Gdsm Noble

ROYAL SIGNALS

Cpl Reynolds
LCpl Feeney
LCpl Herne
Sig Hawkins

The following personnel joined the
Bn during the Operation:

Sig Perry - Port Howard 30 June
Major AIC GORDON Port Howard 11 July

G COMPANY

COMPANY HEADQUARTERS

Maj DALZIEL JOB
Capt POLLOCK (IG)
CSM McKay
CQMS Stirling
Sgt Wilson
LSgt MacKinnon
LSgt Minto
LSgt Samson
LSgt Williams
LCpl Buchan

LCpl Douglas
LCpl Galvin
Gdsm Belford
Gdsm Bradley
Pte Corbett
Gdsm Kirkpatrick
Gdsm Mains
Gdsm Ripley
Pte Stewart
Gdsm Webster

NO 7 PLATOON

Lt JOYNSON
Sgt Anderson
LSgt Hanson
LSgt MacKenzie
LSgt Scott
LCpl Bunyan
LCpl Catchpole
LCpl Gott
LCpl Young
Gdsm Battersby
Gdsm Baxter
Gdsm Campbell
Gdsm Conway
Gdsm Flynn
Gdsm Gillespie
Gdsm Glover
Gdsm Henson
Gdsm Khan
Gdsm Lettice
Gdsm Magee
Gdsm Malcolmson
Gdsm Mitchell
Gdsm Murdoch
Gdsm MacAskill
Gdsm McKay
Gdsm McLeod
Gdsm McWilliams
Gdsm Smith
Gdsm Ward
Gdsm Welsh

NO 8 PLATOON

2Lt PAGE
Sgt Morcom
Sgt Gribble
LSgt Douglass
LSgt Holmes
LCpl Batty
LCpl Greenhalgh
LCpl Morrison
Gdsm Clegg
Gdsm Crawford
Gdsm Dick
Gdsm Gillanders
Gdsm Graham
Gdsm ~~Grundy~~
Gdsm Henderson
Gdsm Houston
Gdsm Hunter
Gdsm Hutton
Gdsm Little
Gdsm MacKay
Gdsm Matthews
Gdsm McLaren
Gdsm McMillan
Gdsm O'Brien
Gdsm Reid
Gdsm Rumney
Gdsm Thompson
Gdsm Whittingham
Gdsm Williams

NO 9 PLATOON

Lt BLOUNT
Sgt MacDonald
LSgt Ferguson
LSgt Patterson
LSgt Scott
LCpl Keers
LCpl Overton
LCpl Turnbull
LCpl Vest
Gdsm Campbell
Gdsm Deasley
Gdsm Dunlop
Gdsm Gilchrist
Gdsm Herrity
Gdsm Hoggan
Gdsm Hunt
Gdsm Hutchins
Gdsm Lindsay
Gdsm McGovern
Gdsm McKinnon
Gdsm McLaren
Gdsm McLaughlan
Gdsm Murphy
Gdsm Reid
Gdsm Spalding
Gdsm Shaw
Gdsm Thomson
Gdsm Ward
Gdsm Watts

RIGHT FLANK

COMPANY HEADQUARTERS

Maj PRICE
Capt BRYDEN
CSM Amos
CQMS Allender
Sgt Middlemass
Sgt Oakes
LSgt Baxter
LSgt Roy
LSgt Whittall
LSgt Wilson
LCpl Cocks

LCpl Collins
LCpl Fleck
LCpl Morling
LCpl Rogers
LCpl Skates
Pte Bottoms
Gdsm Gibb
Gdsm Hardstaff
Gdsm McKay
Gdsm Talman

NO 1 PLATOON

2Lt The Viscount
DALRYMPLE
Sgt Crawford
LSgt McGeorge
LSgt Waterhouse
LCpl Campbell
LCpl Gray
LCpl Mathieson
LCpl McIntosh
LCpl Wright
Ppr Aitchison
Gdsm Alexander
Gdsm Bell
Gdsm Brand 37
Gdsm Broadfoot
Gdsm Cahillane 21
Gdsm Charlton
Gdsm Conn
Gdsm Coyle
Gdsm Craigen
Gdsm Dryburgh
Gdsm Good
Gdsm Graham 05
Gdsm Graham 60
Gdsm Greenshields
Gdsm Hall
Gdsm Hamilton
Gdsm Lawson
Gdsm Morrison
Gdsm O'Hara

NO 2 PLATOON

2Lt MATHEWSON
Sgt Robertson
LSgt Bradley
LSgt Hatton
LCpl Bainbridge
LCpl Bathke
LCpl Brown
LCpl McKinna
LCpl Richardson
LCpl Sinclair
Gdsm Aitchison
Gdsm Cahillane 18
Gdsm Cameron
Gdsm Deeley
Gdsm Duff
Gdsm Fox
Gdsm Graham x 5
Gdsm Heenan
Gdsm Innes
Gdsm Jacobs
Gdsm Jeffrey
Gdsm Kelly
Gdsm Loggie
Gdsm Louden
Gdsm McGuinness
Gdsm Smith

NO 3 PLATOON

Lt LAWRENCE
Sgt Jackson
LSgt Greig
LSgt Marsden
LSgt McDermid
LCpl Reekie
LCpl Rennie
LCpl Simpson
Gdsm Backhouse
Gdsm Brand 57
Gdsm Clark
Gdsm Clough
Ppr Ellwood
Gdsm Gibson
Gdsm Gilfillan
Gdsm Gilmour
Gdsm Harkness
Gdsm Hill
Gdsm McEntaggart
Gdsm McMaster
Gdsm Morton
Gdsm O'Reilly
Gdsm Pengelly
Gdsm Purdie
Gdsm Reading
Gdsm Sutherland
Gdsm Taylor
Gdsm Walkingshaw

26

28

MORTAR PLATOON

PL HQ

Capt FARRELLY
CSgt Buckley
Gdsm McDonald
Ppr Sutherland
Gdsm Wood

C/S 51

Sgt Pitcaithly
LSgt Gill
LSgt Miller
LCpl Perry
Gdsm Blair
Gdsm Brown --
Gdsm Chase
Gdsm Farmer
Gdsm Forbes
Gdsm Hutton
Gdsm Little
Gdsm Quinn
Gdsm Thomson --

C/2 52

Sgt Hammel
LSgt Noble
LSgt Shepherd
LCpl Wolff
Gdsm Collins
Gdsm Cruickshank
Gdsm Davidson --
Gdsm Johnstone --
Gdsm MacFadyen
Gdsm Payne
Gdsm Somerville
Gdsm Spence
Gdsm Turner

C/S 53

LSgt Corbett
LSgt Fisher (WG)
LSgt Harrison
LCpl Harper
LCpl Jones (WG)
LCpl Shannon (WG)
Gdsm Davies (WG)
Gdsm Green (WG)
Gdsm Jones (WG)
Gdsm Mumford (WG)
Gdsm Ponting (WG)
Gdsm Thomson (WG)

MACHINE GUN PLATOON ORBAT

PL HQ

CAPT CAMPBELL-LAMERTON

CSgt Shand

Gdsm Dukes

Ppr McDonald

Gdsm McDowall

No 1 Section

Sgt Marr

LCpl McCabe

LCpl Urquhart

Gdsm Cameron

Gdsm Crawford

Gdsm Kluzniak

Gdsm McKay

Gdsm Miller

Gdsm Saunders

No 2 Section

Sgt Oldham

LSgt Walker

LCpl Allen

LCpl McChesney

Gdsm Barrett

Gdsm Fagan

Gdsm Lugton

Gdsm Martin

Gdsm Marshall

Gdsm Paton

No 3 Section

Sgt Tasker

LCpl Blair

LCpl Winfield

Gdsm Cartmell

Gdsm Cheape

Gdsm Jackson

Gdsm McConnachie

Gdsm Mutch

RECCE PLATOON ORBAT

No 1 Section

Capt SCOTT
Sgt Russell
LSgt Coventry
LSgt Kinsella (IG)
LCpl Limage
Dmr Adamson
Ppr Day
Ppr Fleming

No 2 Section

SSgt Bell
LSgt McLintock
LCpl Donaldson
LCpl Straughton
Dmr Brady
Gdsm Hardie
Ppr MacInnes
Dmr Meechan

No 3 Section

Sgt Allum
Sgt Coull
LSgt Gray
LCpl Beaty
LCpl Nicholson
LCpl Owens
Gdsm Carruthers
Ppr Duffy
Dmr Wand

LEFT FLANK

COMPANY HEADQUARTERS

Maj KISZELY M.C.
Capt The Hon GRIMSTON
CSM Nicol D.C.M.
CQMS Hill
Sgt Matthew
Sgt Taylor
LSgt Simpson
LCpl Galloway
LCpl MacColl
LCpl Murley

LCpl Thomson
Gdsm Archibald
Gdsm Graham
Pte Martin
Gdsm McRobb
Gdsm Porter
Pte Queen
Ppr Rodger
Ppr Spencer

NO 13 PLATOON

2Lt STUART
Sgt Simeon - KIA
* LSgt Davidson
LSgt McGuinness
LCpl Carle
LCpl Eyre
LCpl Hart
LCpl MacLean
LCpl Main
LCpl Reifold
Gdsm Brown 68
Gdsm Cheyne
Gdsm Denton
Gdsm Douglas
Gdsm Fleming
Gdsm Glasper
Gdsm Johnstone
Gdsm Malcolmson KIA
Gdsm Murfitt
Gdsm Osborn - Lg
Gdsm Reynolds - D.C.M. KIA
Gdsm Ridgment
Gdsm Rogers
Gdsm Robinson
Gdsm Shaw
* Gdsm Silver B.M.
Gdsm Smith
Gdsm Tomlinson - KIA
Gdsm Wilkie

NO 14 PLATOON

Lt FRASER
Sgt Gavaghan
LSgt Dayson
LSgt Martin
LSgt Nash
LCpl Bay
LCpl Cameron
LCpl Coventry
LCpl Greenlees
LCpl Stenton
LCpl Timperley
* Gdsm Blackburn Tony
Gdsm Brackstone
Gdsm Bryden
Gdsm Campbell 66
Gdsm Cape - 3rd Lt 1970
Gdsm Daggett
Gdsm Denholm - KIA
Gdsm Horan
Gdsm Jackson
Gdsm McGeough
Gdsm McKay
Gdsm McLellan
Gdsm McQueen
Gdsm Montgomery
Gdsm Slaney
Gdsm Stewart
Gdsm Tait
Gdsm Traynor
Ppr Utting

NO 15 PLATOON

Lt MITCHELL
Sgt Jackson KIA
LSgt Dalglish
LSgt Guthrie
LSgt Mitchell
LCpl Crookdake
LCpl Hinds
LCpl Tytler
LCpl Wilson
Gdsm Allen
Gdsm Binnie
Gdsm Boyes
Gdsm Brown
Gdsm Campbell 01
Gdsm Findlay
Gdsm Forrest
Gdsm Gordon
Gdsm Hamilton
Gdsm Litterick
Gdsm MacKenzie
Gdsm Mitchell
Gdsm McParlane
Gdsm Peters
Gdsm Richardson
Gdsm Rutherford
Gdsm Regan
Gdsm Smart
Gdsm Stirling KIA
Gdsm Taggart

REAR PARTY

Capt BOWSER
Lt ECCLES-WILLIAMS
DSgt Singler

Sgts' Mess

LCpl Bullock

FAMS

Capt MOODY
LSgt Millar
LSgt Nichol

SIGS PL

LSgt Legge
Gdsm McKirdy

LAD

PAY

Sgt Fordham

LSgt Leftwich
Cfn Harris
Cfn Moore

QM

RQMS McConnigle
LSgt Connor
LSgt Hogg
Gdsm Parkes
Gdsm Smith

Right Flank

LCpl Grierson
Gdsm Beattie
Gdsm English
Gdsm Johnstone
Gdsm Scarr
Gdsm Sangster
Gdsm Tallen

DRUMS

LSgt Elder
LCpl Smiles
Dmr McEwan
Ppr MacLean

G Coy

Gdsm Benyon
Gdsm McDougall

F Coy

CSgt Carlin
LSgt Cromar
Gdsm Good

Left Flank

LSgt Pye
Gdsm Gray
Gdsm McFadden
Gdsm Simm

ORD RM

LSgt Lamont
Gdsm Harris
Gdsm Reay

HQ Coy

LCpl Pryde
LCpl Barron
Gdsm Scott
Gdsm Black
Gdsm Stewart

MEL CENTRE

Gdsm Ferns

MT

Gdsm Lochhead
Gdsm Luke
Gdsm MacKay

MORTAR PLATOON

PL HQ

Capt FARRELLY
CSgt Buckley
Gdsm McDonald
Ppr Sutherland
Gdsm Wood

C/S 51

Sgt Pitcaithly
LSgt Gill
LSgt Miller
LCpl Perry
Gdsm Blair
Gdsm Brown -
Gdsm Chase
Gdsm Farmer
Gdsm Forbes
Gdsm Hutton
Gdsm Little
Gdsm Quinn
Gdsm Thomson -

C/2 52

Sgt Hammel
LSgt Noble
LSgt Shepherd
LCpl Wolff
Gdsm Collins
Gdsm Cruickshank
Gdsm Davidson -
Gdsm Johnstone -
Gdsm MacFadyen
Gdsm Payne
Gdsm Somerville
Gdsm Spence
Gdsm Turner

C/S 53

LSgt Corbett
LSgt Fisher (WG)
LSgt Harrison
LCpl Harper
LCpl Jones (WG)
LCpl Shannon (WG)
Gdsm Davies (WG)
Gdsm Green (WG)
Gdsm Jones (WG)
Gdsm Mumford (WG)
Gdsm Ponting (WG)
Gdsm Thomson (WG)

1. Some of the lessons learned from the campaign in the Falkland Islands have little relevance to the UK Priority 1 tasks due to the difference in climate, terrain, enemy tactics, lack of armour and the overall immobility across country, between this country and North West Europe. The lessons therefore listed here will try to adhere to the general rather than to the particular.
2. As a background, the Battalion was involved in preparation for battle, including using helicopters and LCUs and then, finally, conducting a battalion night attack.
3. Maxims. For those unused to a major war, the old maxims of simple plans, time spent on reconnaissance, coordinated fire support and covering fire apply as much as they ever did.

FIREPOWER

4. Enemy Firepower.

- a. Softness of the ground reduced dramatically the effect of enemy 155mm and 105mm artillery and 120mm mortars.
- b. Enemy firepower was uncoordinated and single rounds, rather than those of a battery, caused little concern. DF, with one notable exception, was inflexible and therefore could be walked round.
- c. Much enemy artillery/mortar fire was unobserved (like that onto the Bn assembly area) and was, mostly, ineffective. The Bn suffered one casualty. Once observed, their fire was effective (onto the Bn on reorganisation on Mt Tumbledown); the only way to deal with this was to direct own fire onto likely OP positions (eg Mt William).

5. Own Firepower.

- a. General. Our own indirect fire was vastly superior to the enemy's but marginally effective against a very well dug in position (the enemy did not lose a single man in the preparatory bombardment on Mt Tumbledown, however 7 out of 10 of their SF GPMG's were destroyed because they did not take them into their trenches).
- b. NGS. Naval bombardment was devastating and caused severe morale loss to the enemy.
- c. Field Artillery. Field artillery was very effective but difficult to get really accurate at long range when own troops were 150m from the enemy.
- d. 81mm Mortars. Accurate for close support but see Annex C for problems.
- e. OAS. Very little close air support was available to the Bn for the assault on Mt Tumbledown. It is understood it was used against a 155mm battery for which we were grateful.
- f. Machine Guns. .50 MG were very effective against enemy sangars either to destroy them or their morale. With tracer and loud, slow rates of fire, used as a platoon, they were very good for our morale. Their weight and weight of ammunition severely reduced the options for their use when solely manpacked.

g. Small Arms. The need for an assault rifle with lighter ammunition is well known and confirmed by this campaign. GPMG in light role with maximum tracer, which the enemy disliked, is effective. The LMG, being lighter and easier to handle, is a useful addition.

h. Low Level Air Defence. SA are highly effective, particularly GPMGs on Louch Poles and .50 MGs, used en masse. The Bn accounted for 2 Skyhawks and a possible third at Bluff Cove. LLAD must be practised.

6. Other Weapons.

a. Grenades. White Phosphorous 80 Grenades were excellent for digging enemy out of trenches rather than L2's. M79 is an excellent weapon but more ammunition must be issued (our issue was 12 per gun) - M203 is even better and should be issued to each section.

b. 66mm. 66mm were very effective against enemy sangers and lower enemy morale. 84mm were also effective but heavy and unwieldy.

c. Bayonet. The bayonet, despite heated argument, remains very effective (two officers killed enemy with their bayonets).

d. Small HE Mortar. 51mm Mor with HE is essential for really close support.

TACTICS

7. Enemy Tactics. Although well fed, well armed, and well prepared, in the end the enemy failed through lack of experience, coordination and will power. They did not patrol or counter attack. Although they possessed some better night vision devices than us they disliked the night and would not move out of their trenches. Although they had depth, their positions lacked mutual support. Their minefields were often not covered by direct or observed fire and were not combined with wire obstacles. Their positions were very well prepared and almost impervious to indirect fire and they made great use of booby traps right amongst their positions. They did not employ forward OPs or standing patrols.

8. Own Tactics.

a. Night. The Bn attack was by night and achieved all the advantages (and disadvantages) that that produced. This must be so and we believe that daylight attacks must now be the exception. We must train more at night (old demand!).

b. Surprise. Again, an old lesson. At Mt Tumbledown, we used a highly successful diversionary attack (we learned from PW later that the enemy thought this was the main thrust). Any tactic that employs surprise and the unexpected is well worth the complication and the tasking of additional troops.

c. Patrols. Patrols, particularly those going in/out of another company/battalion area are much more difficult to coordinate than on an exercise. The dangers of clashes and compromise sometimes negate the value of putting a patrol out.

d. Liaison. Liaison between units must not be left up to themselves. Higher formation must also coordinate where there are important decisions to be made.

9. Intelligence. The importance of intelligence is well known. In this campaign it was not good. Before the attack on Mt Tumbledown, we had no air photographs and only a rough idea of the strength and position of the enemy, both of which were incorrect.

10. SITREPs. SITREPs coming downwards were scarce. The importance of a 'No Change' or 'Nothing to Report' is not always realised.

HELICOPTERS

12. General. Helicopters were the life blood of the campaign. Tasking, particularly, of SH was unwieldy and inflexible. Unreliability, through appalling weather and serviceability, confounded well laid plans.
13. Liaison. Contact between ground troops and SH pilots did not exist. This led to troops being dropped in the wrong place, helicopters flying in-correct routes and into enemy observed areas and dropping stores in wrong locations. Some SH navigator map reading was suspect.
14. Resupply. Resupply by helicopter was a chancy business and a constant worry due to unreliability.

LOGISTICS

15. Casevac. Casevac from forward positions to RAP or Field Ambulance could only really be done by helicopter. Stretchers are too heavy; we need a much lighter version. It was a 2 hour journey by stretcher from Mt Tumbledown to our RAP, by then a man could be dead. It was only through bravery of light helicopter pilots that our wounded were evacuated; this must happen in future and helicopters must be risked to bring our casualties from forward positions.
16. Organisation. The logistic organisation, due to a number of factors, was totally inadequate. The only way the Battalion survived was to have a QM colocated with the Ordnance Company, the Echelon Commander at BG HQ and small CCMS Echelon parties well forward with the companies. Constant forethought was needed to build up stocks on the ground to cushion against the absence of standard resupply, which happened constantly.
17. Returns. Returns (G, A and Q) must be as simple as possible in this kind of war and the proformas must be able to be carried in a pocket. We had to amend, or change, our SOPs three times in so many weeks.

BATTALION ORGANISATION

18. Recco Platoon. A recco platoon is essential. We formed ours at the training at Sonnybridge which was hardly in time. It was only through the training of a former SAS officer that the platoon was as effective as it was.
19. Echelons. Small A1 Echelon Parties (about 15 people), with CCMS, should be up close to the forward companies. They act as bearers and stretcher parties. They are drawn from HQ Company.
20. Battalion and Company HQs. These must be properly duplicated so that if the forward HQ is destroyed, then the alternative can take over. This worked well in the Bn.

EQUIPMENT

21. Signal Equipment. - Annex A.
22. Personal Equipment. - Annex B.
23. 81mm Mortar. - Annex C.

MORALE

24. Aggression and Courage. Courage, like fear, is infectious. There is no doubt that aggressive leadership from commanders well forward can achieve tremendous results against odds.

25. Hospital Treatment. The medical treatment our wounded received was outstanding. However, the visiting system on the hospital ship UGANDA was disgraceful. There was a complete failure to realise that it was vital for the wounded to be visited by all ranks, not just COs and Padres, to raise the wounded's morale and also that of those ashore who could then see how well their friends were recovering. This was one of the major failings of the after - campaign.

26. Regimental Spirit. The battle for Mt Tumbledown epitomised the regimental spirit. Men went on forward under fire because they were with their friends and they were part of the Family (section, platoon, company, battalion). They could not have fought as well had the system not given them this depth of confidence and togetherness.

LESSONS LEARNED - SIGNALS EQUIPMENT

1. Batteries. Rechargeable batteries are too heavy and last too short a time. Lithium batteries should be issued.
2. 352 Amplifiers. Amplifiers constantly broke down.
3. Battery Charging. Battery charging was very difficult. 10 Fd Whsp were meant to do it but we never had a single battery charged by them. Honda generators and ACCUs should be issued.
4. Packing. 351 and 320 were not adaptable to carriage other than on the pack frame. Operating from a bergen was difficult.
5. Antennae. 351 antennae broke frequently, particularly at the base. Old A41 style antennae were better.
6. Coax Cables. Coax Cables are too short. They should be double the length.
7. Masts. 8m masts snap easily in the cold.
8. Range. 350 range is adequate from platoon to company. 351s are too big and bulky for fighting at platoon level and were not used.
9. CEIs. CEIs are far too big and bulky. In this kind of warfare these must be cut down to assist commanders and signallers.
10. NUCO. NUCO was good and worked well.
11. Frequency Changing. This should be done at midday to avoid having to use torches at midnight.
12. Secure Kit. Secure Fit was not used. It could be installed in a trailer with a generator and then underslung forward.
13. Repair. No kit sent in for repair was ever returned! Spares were unavailable.

LESSONS LEARNED - PERSONAL EQUIPMENT

1. Night Viewing Devices. The enemy's were better than ours. The IWS is obsolete and cumbersome. We need the third generation night viewing device on a wide distribution.
2. Digging Tool. The shovel is right but the handle is weak.
3. IPK. Useful as shelter. Eyslets would be useful.
4. Belt Kit. We discarded kidney pouches and cape carrier in favour of two extra water bottle carriers. The essentials on the belt are: ammunition/grenades, water bottle, mess tin with 24 hrs survival rations and hexamine, shell dressings and waterproof.
5. Bergen. A Bergen was essential. The issue large pack is useless.
6. Maps. Fabricated maps (issued) were excellent. A small fold up camouflaged map case which can be hooked to the belt is ideal.
7. FILOFAX. The FILOFAX notebook system is invaluable. Reports/returns could be tailored to this system.
8. Clothing. We were against wet and a very cold wind which equalled exposure. We need full windproof combat clothing (as issued to some people), the ordinary suit is hopeless. Waterproofs (DPM and dark green) were inadequate. We need the (expensive) GORTEX jackets which are totally waterproof but can 'breathe' therefore do not condense.
9. Sleeping Bag Cover. The issue sleeping bag cover caused condensation. The GORTEX cover is ideal; those who had bought their own found them ideal. Made by BERGHAUS.
10. Boots. DMS boots are inadequate. Overboots are essential or arctic boots and snow gaiters (as issued to RM Cdo).
11. Arctic Headover and Socks. Excellent.
12. Gloves. Arctic gloves with waterproof were good but difficult to operate in. Combat gloves (NI version) were no good.
13. Webbing. Webbing is under trial. Hopefully the result will be good. A vest with pockets for ammunition would be good for the GPMG gunner.

LESSONS LEARNED - 81MM MORTAR

1. Basoplate. Needs strengthening. It sinks in soft peat and breaks on rock. The 'nest' was not tried as it needed to be filled with firm soil; **this** is impossible to find in peated country.
2. Bipod. Too weak for Charge 8. The clamp or traversing gear broke.
3. Ammunition. Ammunition must come packed to its highest charge.
4. Manpack. Manpack frames are useless. We did not use them as they are clumsy and uncomfortable.

same area
the edge

INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL MENENDEZ

These notes were made by the Padre, Reverend A Smith following an interview with the guard-on board MV St Edmund at Port Stanley on the 28th June 1982.

Q. In the Falklands campaign, what was the decisive battle?

A. Mount Tumbledown was the decisive battle. It was the last high feature that had to be retained if our base position at Stanley was not to be taken.

Q. How successful was the bombardment of your positions?

A. Your Naval bombardment was not very effective mainly due to its inaccuracy. Even sustained bombardment did not cause much damage or many casualties when we were dug in. It was looked upon more as a nuisance factor.

Q. What about our artillery bombardment?

A. Your artillery bombardment however was devastating both in respect of its accuracy and in respect of the casualties caused. The sustained bombardment also made our troops battleweary, tired and ineffective even before the battle of Tumbledown began. Our artillery range was also much shorter than yours. Our artillery sub-units that were further forward could not be resupplied when they were running short (again due to the accuracy of your fire). We also feared Harrier bombardment which was also very effective.

Q. What about Sapper Hill?

A. Sapper Hill was not of decisive importance to our defences. This was because it was a lower feature and therefore of no consequence really after Tumbledown was taken.

Q. How did you feel after the battle of Tumbledown?

A. I realised after Tumbledown was taken therefore that the game was up if my men were not to be massacred.

Q. Why did you surrender at that point?

A. It is part of a Commander's duty to accept realities especially when they become obvious and hence I met Major General Royal Marinos after Tumbledown.

Additional

1. For Menendez the two decisive battles were Longdon and Tumbledown.
2. The enemy's defensive positions and particularly their underground trenches were bothered considerably by flooding.
3. The Argentinians had a high incidence of "trench foot".
4. The blockade by sea and by air was effective, making resupply very difficult.